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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SEE NO EVIL, HEAR NO EVIL, SPEAK NO EVIL: AN ARGUMENT
FOR A JURY DETERMINATION OF THE ENMUND/TISON
CULPABILITY FACTORS IN CAPITAL FELONY MURDER CASES

INTRODUCTION
1

“[D]eath is different.” When used to punish, death taps society’s most
primal urges. It is meant to be a deterrent for potential offenders, triggering in
them the innate reflex for self-preservation. For society, it is meant to feed the
primal desire for retribution. For these very reasons, it is often claimed that
death is only reserved for the worst of the worst.
However, in trying to ensure that the above axioms remain true, courts
have struggled.2 Most capital murder prosecutions proceed in at least two
phases: a guilt phase and a sentencing/penalty phase.3 During the guilt phase,
the Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury determination of every fact
necessary to establish the elements of the offense with which he is charged.4
In the sentencing phase, the judge or the jury weighs aggravating factors—
facts or circumstances that, if found, militate for a harsher punishment—
against mitigating factors—circumstances which call for a more lenient
punishment—to determine the appropriate sentence for the defendant.5 Until
recently, the Supreme Court has held that the defendant does not have a
constitutional right to a jury determination of sentencing factors in the
sentencing phase.6 In other words, Sixth Amendment rights that applied to
factual determinations in the guilt phase had not been constitutionally required
for factual determinations traditionally made in the penalty phase.7 As capital
criminal prosecutions developed, a clear line between the fact finding in the
guilt phase and the fact finding in the sentencing phase crystallized.8
1. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
2. Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
475, 476 (2005).
3. See e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (holding that a bifurcated criminal proceeding did
satisfy constitutional concerns).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speed and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . . ”)
5. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984).
6. Id.; see also Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385–86 (1986).
7. Cabana, 474 U.S. at 385–86.
8. John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 1968 (2005).
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Today, the border between guilt phase fact finding and penalty phase fact
finding no longer exists. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court broadened the
scope of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury and has
applied it to facts traditionally considered sentencing factors.9 In Apprendi v.
New Jersey, the Court held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”10 Labeling a fact as a “sentencing factor”
no longer determines whether the defendant is entitled to a jury determination
of that fact. The Court stated that the relevant inquiry as to whether a fact
increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum “is not one of form, but of
effect.”11 If the finding of a fact has the effect of increasing the penalty
beyond the statutory maximum, it must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt, regardless of whether it is found in the guilt phase or the sentencing
phase.12
Soon after the court established the Apprendi rule, it applied it to the
question of whether statutory aggravating circumstances, which made capital
defendants eligible for the death penalty in capital cases and were typically
considered as sentencing factors, were required by the Sixth Amendment to be
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.13 Reiterating its holding in
Apprendi, the Court in Ring v. Arizona held that such aggravating factors must
be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of whether the state
labeled such factors as sentencing factors or elements of an offense.14
But the scope of the holding in Ring was unclear. Exactly which facts did
it cover? What about facts that proved a defendant’s culpability? In Tison v.
Arizona, the Supreme Court determined that in capital cases where the
defendant was not the “triggerman,” a finding that the defendant either
intended to kill or that the defendant was a major participant in the felony and
demonstrated a reckless indifference to human life was required before the
death penalty could be imposed upon the defendant.15 If such a finding was
not made, then the imposition of the death penalty violated the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against grossly disproportionate punishment.16 This

9. Cunningham v. California, 127 S.Ct. 856 (2007); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
10. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
11. Id. at 494.
12. Id. at 490.
13. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597 (2002).
14. Id. at 609.
15. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157–58 (1986).
16. Id.; see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982). “The Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment is directed, in part, ‘against all punishments which
by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged.’” Id.
(quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910)).
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holding substantially broadened the Court’s previous rule, set forth in Enmund
v. Florida, that a defendant who was not the actual killer could not be
sentenced to death absent a finding that the defendant either attempted to kill,
intended that a killing take place, or contemplated that lethal force would be
employed.17 For the purposes of this note, the Enmund/Tison culpability
factors are the findings that (1) a felony-murder non-triggerman defendant
either intended or attempted to kill, or (2) was a major participant in the
underlying felony and displayed a reckless disregard for human life.
Since the Ring decision in 2002, lower courts have ruled that the Sixth
Amendment principles established in Apprendi and Ring do not require that a
jury make Eighth Amendment Enmund/Tison findings.18 In making these
holdings, the lower courts are mistaken in four respects: 1) the holdings
mischaracterize the function of the Enmund/Tison findings; 2) the lower courts
fail to recognize the vital role of the jury in deciding punishments based on a
retributive theory of punishment; 3) the lower courts fail to recognize that the
historical rationale on which Apprendi and Ring are based applies to the
Enmund/Tison findings; and 4) the support the lower courts draw from the preApprendi case, Cabana v. Bullock, is misplaced in light of the developments of
the Apprendi line of cases.
This Comment argues that in light of the Supreme Court decisions in
Apprendi and its progeny, the Enmund/Tison culpability findings for nontriggermen felony murderers must be made by a jury and found beyond a
reasonable doubt. To establish this argument, Part I of this Comment
examines the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis in the context of
capital punishment and how it serves as the basis for the Enmund and Tison
decisions. Part II then examines the broadening effect the Apprendi line of
cases had on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. Part III
examines the lower court opinions which have declined to apply the
Apprendi/Ring rule to the Enmund/Tison findings. Finally, Part IV critiques
the lower court opinions and establishes that the Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis and the reasoning in the Apprendi line of cases
requires that the Enmund/Tison findings must be made by a jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.

17. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797.
18. Arizona v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 944 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc); Brown v. State of Oklahoma,
67 P.3d 917, 920 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003); Harlow v. State of Wyoming, 70 P.3d 179, 204 (Wyo.
2003) (where a jury did not make the requisite Enmund/Tison findings, the Wyoming Supreme
Court reviewed the case record and found that the defendant was a major participant in the
murder and acted with reckless indifference to human life).
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I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CAPITAL JURISPRUDENCE: CULPABILITY AND JUST
DESSERTS
Although capital punishment has a long history at common law, modernday capital punishment jurisprudence began in 1972 with Furman v.
Georgia.19 In five separate concurring opinions,20 the Court struck down
Georgia’s death penalty law as violating the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment because the decision of who should
receive death penalty was left to the unguided discretion of the jury, which
created the risk that it was applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner.21 As
a result, the reasoning in Furman invalidated all then existing state death
penalty statutes.22
Cases after Furman established two principles as constitutional
requirements for the imposition of the death penalty: (1) death penalty statutes
must guard against arbitrariness by sufficiently guiding the sentencer’s
discretion;23 (2) the death penalty may not be imposed if it is
disproportionately excessive in light of the specific circumstances of the
crime.24 The proportionality analysis was clarified in Coker v. Georgia.25 The
Court stated that the death penalty is disproportionate, and therefore
unconstitutional, if it “(1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable
goals of punishment;26 . . . or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of
the crime.”27 The underlying principle to both inquiries in the proportionality
analysis (and the Eighth Amendment generally) is that “the fundamental
respect for humanity” must be maintained.28 The proportionality test is

19. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 333 (1972) (“Capital punishment has been used to
penalize various forms of conduct by members of society since the beginnings of civilization.”).
20. See generally, id. at 240 (Douglas, J., Brennan, J., Stewart, J., White, J., Marshall, J.
concurring)
21. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (stating “there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing
the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”); JOSHUA
DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 314-15 (West Group 2d ed. 1999).
22. Id.
23. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196–97 (1976) (upholding Georgia’s statutory
aggravating factors); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Ultimate Authority on the Ultimate Punishment:
The Requisite Role of the Jury in Capital Sentencing, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (2003).
24. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187, 206.
25. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
26. The two most common goals are retribution, which focuses on the defendant’s
culpability to determine the severity of the punishment, and deterrence. See infra Part IV.2.
27. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (holding the imposition death penalty as grossly disproportionate
to the crime of rape).
28. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (striking down North Carolina’s
mandatory death sentencing statute); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (striking down
Ohio’s statute which precluded the sentencer from considering mitigating factors at sentencing;
because “the imposition of death . . . is so profoundly different from all other penalties[,] . . . [t]he
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satisfied when the sentencer properly considers the “particularized nature of
the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant.”29
The rationale underlying both the Enmund and Tison decisions was based on
these proportionality principles.30
A.

Capital Punishment and Felony Murder

Both Enmund and Tison were felony murder cases.31 At common law, the
felony murder rule provides that one who kills another during the course of a
felony or attempted commission of a felony is guilty of murder.32 By
transferring a defendant’s intent to commit the felony to satisfy the malice
element of murder, the doctrine creates strict liability for deaths that occur
during the course of a felony.33 Liability also extends to accomplices to the
commission of felonies who may have not actually killed the victim.34 The
underlying principle for this broad reach of liability is the fact that the death is
directly linked to the felony and would not have occurred without it.35
Accordingly, because non-triggerman felony murder defendants are held liable
for murder, they are exposed to the same punishments as premeditated
murders.36
B.

Enmund v. Florida: No Intent, No Death

In 1982, in Enmund v. Florida, the Supreme Court addressed whether the
Eighth Amendment prohibited imposition of the death penalty on nontriggermen defendants who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill.37 The
Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against grossly
disproportionate punishment precluded imposition of the death penalty on a
defendant convicted of first-degree felony murder where no finding was made
that the defendant killed or intend to kill.38
need for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of
the individual is far more important than in non capital cases.”).
29. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206. The jury could “consider any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, [but it had to] find and identify at least one aggravating factor before it may impose
a penalty of death.” Id.
30. See infra Part I. 2–3.
31. See generally Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137
(1987).
32. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 515 (Lexis Publishing 3d ed.
2001).
33. Id.; Lily Kling, Constitutionalizing the Death Penalty for Accomplices to Felony
Murder, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463, 464 (1988).
34. DRESSLER, supra note 32, at 516.
35. Kling, supra note 33, at 464.
36. DRESSLER, supra note 32, at 515.
37. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 787 (1982).
38. Id. at 797.
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In Enmund, the defendant was the getaway driver in a double homicide
armed robbery.39 He was neither present when the plan to rob the victims was
hatched nor when the actual killings took place.40 Nonetheless, the defendant
was convicted of first degree felony murder under a Florida statute that
required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was “actually
present and was actively aiding and abetting the robbery or attempted robbery,
and that the unlawful killing occurred in the perpetration of or in the attempted
perpetration of the robbery.”41
To determine whether Enmund’s death sentence violated the Eighth
Amendment, the Court looked at legislative judgments and jury decisions to
ascertain the evolving standards of decency that establish what is cruel and
unusual punishment.42 The Court found that only eight of the thirty-eight
states that permitted the death penalty allowed for its imposition solely for the
defendant’s participation in a robbery during which a murder was committed.43
The Court also found that out of the 362 executions since 1954, only six were
non-triggermen felony murderers.44 A survey of the nation’s death row
population provided further evidence that juries rejected imposing the death
penalty on non-triggerman defendants who did not participate in either the
planning of or the actual killings.45 Looking at this data, the Court found that
society had come to reject the imposition of the death penalty for nontriggermen felony murderers who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to
kill.46
The other factor the Court weighed in determining if the imposition of the
death penalty was disproportionate for non-triggerman defendants was the
individual defendant’s culpability or “moral guilt.”47 For the imposition of the
death penalty to pass the Eighth Amendment bar, the sentencer must grant
individualized consideration to the relevant facts and character of the
offender.48 The Court found that “Enmund did not kill or intend to kill and
thus his culpability [was] plainly different from that of the robbers who killed;
yet the state treated them alike.”49 The State, through the statute, was not
allowed to attribute the culpability of the actual killers to Enmund for the

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 784.
Id. at 786.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 788–94.
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 792.
Id. at 794–95.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 794.
Id. at 798.
Id.
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798.
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purpose of implementing the death penalty.50 Because Enmund lacked the
intent to kill and did not consider that lethal force would be used during the
crime, the Court found that the threat of the death penalty could not be a proper
deterrent if the defendant did not contemplate that it would result from his
actions.51 Likewise, because Enmund did not possess the heightened
culpability necessary of one who actually killed or intended to kill, executing
Enmund would not have “measurably contribute[d] to the retributive end of
ensuring that the criminal gets his just deserts.”52
In the language of Corker, the Court found that putting Enmund to death
made no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and was
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.53 The result was that the
death penalty could not be imposed on a non-triggerman felony murder
defendant absent a finding that the defendant in fact killed, attempted to kill, or
intended that a killing take place.54
The Court’s ruling in Enmund did little in terms of giving guidance to how
such findings should be made. A case with an identical fact pattern to Enmund
would be easily decided, but the question of what facts indicated an intent or
knowledge that lethal force would be used remained unanswered. Justice
O’Connor’s dissent in Enmund predicted this confusion because the ruling
made “intent a matter of federal constitutional law, requiring [the] Court both
to review highly subjective definitional problems customarily left to state
criminal law and to develop an Eighth Amendment meaning of intent.”55
C. Tison v. Arizona: Recklessness Substitutes for Intent
Nearly four years later, the Court revisited its ruling in Enmund in Tison v.
Arizona.56 In Tison, the defendants were convicted of first-degree felony
murder after aiding family members escape from jail and murdering innocent
passers-by during the course of the escape.57 The Court held that although
they did not kill or intend to kill, a finding that the defendants were major
participants in the felony and that they exhibited a reckless indifference to
human life satisfied the Enmund culpability requirement.58

50. Id.
51. Id. at 799.
52. Id. at 800–01.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 27–28.
54. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
55. Id. at 825 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). This criticism applies equally to her decision in
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), where the term “reckless” could be substituted for the
term “intent.”
56. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 137 (1987).
57. Id. at 141–42.
58. Id. at 158.
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The Court noted that Enmund dealt only with two distinct poles in the
spectrum of felony murder cases.59 On one end were those defendants who
were only minor actors and not on the scene and who did not intend to kill and
to whom no culpable mental state could be imputed.60 On the opposite
extreme were the felony murderers; those who actually killed, attempted to
kill, or intended to kill.61 In Tison, the Court narrowed the Eighth Amendment
prohibition on the imposition of the death penalty by expanding the scope of
the Enmund culpability factors to include a fourth category of defendants—
those who were major participants in the underlying felony and manifested a
reckless indifference to human life.62
The Court performed a similar analysis to that in Enmund and found that
only eleven states did not allow the imposition of the death penalty for a
defendant who was a major participant in the underlying felony and exhibited
More importantly, the Court reaffirmed the
extreme recklessness.63
importance of an individualized determination of culpability by determining
the severity of the punishment to be imposed on an offender. 64 In discussing
the individualized determination of the defendants in Tison, the Court nodded
to the trial court’s determination that the defendants’ participation in the crimes
was “substantial.”65 The Court pointed out that the defendants were actively
involved in the elements of the kidnapping and robbery and that they were both
present when the victims were killed.66
This time, as opposed to Edmund, the individualized examination of the
defendants’ culpability resulted in a different conclusion as to whether putting
the defendants to death contributed to an acceptable goal of punishment. The
Court found that executing a defendant who manifested a reckless disregard for
human life, a highly culpable mental state, did contribute to the retributive goal
of “ensuring that a criminal gets his just deserts.”67
Enmund and Tison established the required findings that a state must make
before imposing death penalty on a non-triggerman felony murder defendant.68
The Eighth Amendment does not bar the imposition of the death penalty on
non-triggermen felony murder defendants who actually killed, attempted to
kill, or intended to kill, or on those who were major participants in the

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
(1982).

Id. at 149.
Id.
Id. at 150.
Tison, 481 U.S. at 158.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 158.
Id.
See id. at 149, 157.
See generally Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458, U.S. 782
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underlying felony and whose conduct exhibited reckless indifference to human
life. 69 However, in neither case did the Court establish exactly who must
make the findings. Was a defendant entitled to a jury to make these findings?
Could the trial court make these findings?
II. SIXTH AMENDMENT CAPITAL JURISPRUDENCE: ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE
VS. SENTENCING FACTORS
The Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury in conjunction with the Due
Process Clause “entitle[s] a criminal defendant ‘to a jury determination that
[he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a
reasonable doubt.’”70 Before the decisions in Apprendi and Ring, this
constitutional protection was confined to the guilt phase of capital
prosecutions. Despite recognizing that capital sentencing resembles the guilt
phase of a trial in some respects,71 the Court held that the Sixth Amendment
right to a trial by jury did not extend into the capital sentencing phase of a
prosecution.72 Thus, this distinction between the guilt phase and sentencing
phase had significant consequences as to what facts a legislature designated as
elements of the offense and which were merely sentencing factors. Elements
of the offense had to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; sentencing
factors did not.73 Moreover, the Court recognized that states had the power
and the right to define those substantive elements of the offense which had to
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.74 In the capital criminal proceeding
Walton v. Arizona, the Court demonstrated the same deference to the states’
power to define elements of an offense by concluding that the Constitution did
not require that the State denominate aggravating circumstances as elements of
a capital murder offense.75 Apprendi, however, ushered in a new era where the

69. Tison, 481 U.S. at 158; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
70. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (quoting United States v. Gaudin,
515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)).
71. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 458 (1984) (“‘[E]mbarrassment, expense and ordeal’ .
. . faced by a defendant at the penalty phase of a . . . capital murder trial . . . are at least
equivalent to that faced by any defendant at the guilt phase of a criminal trial . . . .”) (quoting
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)).
72. Id. at 459 (“[A] capital sentencing proceeding involves the same fundamental issue
involved in any other sentencing proceeding—a determination of the appropriate punishment to
be imposed on an individual. The Sixth Amendment never has been thought to guarantee a right
to a jury determination of that issue.”).
73. Id.
74. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 US. 79, 85 (1986) (“[I]n determining what facts must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the state legislature's definition of the elements of the offense
is usually dispositive . . . .”).
75. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990) (holding that as sentencing factors, the
aggravating circumstances had to be found by a jury).
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traditional distinction between the guilt phase and the sentencing phase is no
longer valid.
A.

Apprendi v. New Jersey: Facts Without Borders

In 2000, the ground shifted. The Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v.
New Jersey76 held “that any fact [other than a prior conviction] that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”77 In Apprendi,
the defendant pled guilty to two counts of second degree possession of a
firearm and one count of third degree possession of an antipersonnel
explosive.78 During a post conviction hearing, the prosecutor moved to
increase Apprendi’s sentence based on New Jersey’s statutory hate crime
sentence enhancer.79 The statute defined a hate crime as one where the
“defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an
individual or group of individuals because of race . . . .”80
The State argued that the judge could impose the increased sentence
because the hate crime enhancement was a sentencing factor, not an element of
the underlying offense81 and that the Sixth Amendment only applied to the
facts necessary to establish guilt.82 Thus, once the jury returned a verdict of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge could then impose a sentence
according to his discretion.83
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens rejected the State’s argument by
examining the historical context out of which the Sixth Amendment arose.84
The principle that a criminal defendant is entitled to “a jury determination that
[he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a
reasonable doubt” reaches back centuries into the common law.85 Citing
Justice Story, Justice Stevens paid homage to the right to a trial by jury as a
“‘guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers,’ and
‘the great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties.’”86
Additionally, Justice Stevens noted that at the founding of the nation there
was no distinction between an “element” of an offense and a “sentencing

76. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
77. Id. at 490.
78. Id. at 469–70.
79. Id. at 470.
80. Id. at 468–69.
81. Id. at 471–72.
82. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466.
83. Id. at 481.
84. Id. at 476–85.
85. Id. at 477 (quoting U.S. v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 519 (1995)).
86. Id. (quoting J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
540–41 (4th ed. 1873)).
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factor.”87 The jury was charged with finding “all of the facts and
circumstances which constitute the offense.”88 Because “[t]he substantive
criminal law tended to be sanction-specific,” once the verdict was entered, the
judge had little discretion in imposing the sentence required by law.89
Due process cases that preceded and presaged Apprendi were also essential
to the rationale underlying the Apprendi rule.90 The Court stated that the due
process “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” protections established in In re
Winship91 extended, “to some degree, ‘to determinations that [go] not to a
defendant’s guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his sentence.”92 A
state could not avoid such protections by “redefining the elements that
constitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely on
the extent of punishment.”93
Turning to the New Jersey Statute, the Court found that the hate-crime
statute exposed a defendant convicted of a second degree weapons offense, to
the same punishment as a first-degree weapons offense.94 The decision to
trigger the New Jersey statutory hate crime sentence enhancer was made by a
judge after he found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Apprendi
unlawfully possessed a weapon for the purpose of intimidating the victim
based on the victim’s race.95
Because the hate crime statute called for an inquiry into Apprendi’s mens
rea in order to justify sentence enhancement, the Court noted that a
“defendant’s intent in committing a crime is . . . as close as one might hope to
come to a core criminal offense ‘element.’”96 To determine whether a fact fell
within the traditional jurisdiction of a jury, the question “is one not of form,
but of effect—does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?”97 If yes, then
such a finding must be made by a jury and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.98
87. Id. at 478.
88. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478 (quoting JOHN FREDERICK ARCHBOLD, PLEADING AND
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 44 (15th ed. 1862)).
89. Id. at 479.
90. Id. at 484–87.
91. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding “that the Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”).
92. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484 (citing Alamendarez-Torres v. U.S., 523 U.S. 224, 251
(1998)(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
93. Id. at 485 (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 579, 698 (1976)).
94. Id. at 491.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 493.
97. Id. at 494.
98. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
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Ring v. Arizona: The Eighth Amendment and Sixth Amendment
Confluence

The ruling in Apprendi was no minor shift in preserving the role of the jury
in criminal procedure. In Ring v. Arizona,99 the Court applied the new
Apprendi rule to capital crimes. The Court overruled Walton v. Arizona100 and
held that Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme, which required a judge
determine the existence of aggravating factors required to impose the death
sentence, violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right that any fact
increasing the penalty beyond the statutory maximum be found by jury beyond
a reasonable doubt.101
On November 28, 1994, Timothy Ring and two other co-defendants
robbed a Wells Fargo armored van and killed the driver.102 Upon a search of
Ring’s house, the police found a duffel bag containing more than $271,000 in
cash.103
At trial, the prosecutor submitted alternative theories of premeditated
murder and felony murder.104 However, the evidence was insufficient “to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Ring] was a major participant in the
robbery or that he actually murdered [the victim].”105 The jury was unable to
convict Ring on the theory of premeditated murder but convicted him of first
degree felony murder under the theory that the murder occurred during the
course of an armed robbery (a felony).106
Under Arizona’s sentencing scheme, the jury’s verdict subjected Ring to a
maximum punishment of life imprisonment unless a judge made additional
findings of aggravating circumstances in a separate sentencing hearing.107 The
Arizona statute allowed the judge to determine at the end of the hearing
whether any enumerated aggravating or mitigating circumstances were
present.108 If the judge determined that at least one aggravating circumstance
was present and not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances that would
call for leniency, the judge could sentence the defendant to death.109
Prior to Ring’s sentencing hearing, one of his co-defendants struck a deal
with prosecutors in exchange for testimony in which he would name Ring as

99. Id. (holding that the Sixth Amendment did not require a jury to find statutory
aggravating factors that rendered a capital defendant eligible for the death penalty).
100. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
101. Ring, 536 U.S. at 589.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 590.
104. Id. at 591.
105. Id. (quoting State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1152 (2001) (first alteration in original)).
106. Id.
107. Ring, 536 U.S. at 592.
108. Id. at 592–93.
109. Id. at 593.
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the leader of the group and as the one who shot and killed the victim.110 The
co-defendant testified at Ring’s sentencing hearing accordingly.111
Because Ring was convicted under the felony murder theory and not
premeditated murder, Ring was only eligible for the death penalty if
Enmund/Tison findings were made.112 The judge found that Ring was the
actual killer, that Ring was a major participant in the armed robbery, and that
Ring exhibited a reckless disregard or indifference to human life.113 In making
these findings, the judge cited the co-defendant’s testimony at the sentencing
hearing.114After finding two aggravating factors and determining that Ring’s
minimal criminal record did not call for leniency, the judge sentenced Ring to
death.115
In considering whether Arizona’s statute violated Ring’s Sixth
Amendment right as set forth in Apprendi, the Court began its discussion with
a telling statement: “Based solely on the jury’s verdict finding Ring guilty of
first-degree felony murder, the maximum punishment he could have received
was life imprisonment.”116 Arizona required that in order for the death penalty
to be legally imposed, at least one aggravating factor needed to be found by a
judge beyond a reasonable doubt.117 The rule in Apprendi specifically dealt
with such schemes, did it not? The answer, even to the most casual observer,
would have to be, yes.
Before answering the above question affirmatively, the Court had to deal
with its prior ruling in Walton, which upheld the Arizona sentencing scheme at
issue in Ring.118 The reasoning in Walton was based on the pre-Apprendi
notion that because an aggravator was not an element of the crime of capital
murder and merely placed a “substantive limit on sentencing,” such an
aggravator or sentencing factor was not required to be found by a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt.119
The Court’s rationale for overruling Walton started with a historical
analysis. Picking up where Apprendi left off, the Court looked to Justice
Stevens’s dissent in Walton for the historical context of the Sixth Amendment

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 594.
113. Ring, 536 U.S. at 594.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 594–95.
116. Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
117. Id.
118. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990).
119. Id. The Walton Court relied on the ruling in Cabana v. Bullock which stated that
because the Enmund findings entailed no “element of the crime of capital murder” and only
“place[d] a substantive limitation on sentencing” such findings were not required to be made by a
jury. Id.
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right to a jury trial. Justice Stevens argued that the “Sixth Amendment
requires a jury determination of facts that must be established before the death
penalty may be imposed. Aggravators operate as statutory elements of capital
murder under Arizona law because in their absence, [the death] sentence is
unavailable.”120 Stevens pointed out that a jury in 1791 “had the power to
determine not only whether the defendant was guilty of homicide but also the
degree of the offense.”121 The jury’s right to determine issues such as the
defendant’s eligibility for capital punishment and “which homicide defendants
would be subject to capital punishment by making factual determinations . . .
related to . . . assessments of the defendant’s state of mind” was unquestioned
by the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights.122
The Court moved on to the Apprendi ruling, reasserting the Court’s
rationale that “the dispositive question is not one of form but of effect.”123 If a
fact exposes the defendant to a “penalty exceeding the maximum he would
receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone,”
that fact, no matter how the state labeled it, must be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.124 The Court concluded, “Because Arizona’s enumerated
aggravating factors operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a
greater offense,’ the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a
jury.”125
C. Blakely v. Washington:126 Apprendi’s Rule Solidified
Shortly after the Supreme Court reaffirmed Apprendi’s rule in Ring, the
Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington expressed the Court’s commitment
to Apprendi and “the need to give intelligible content to the right of jury
trial.”127 Although Blakely was not a capital felony murder case, its strong
endorsement for the rule in Apprendi and Ring make it significant to this
Comment’s discussion.
The defendant in Blakely pled guilty to kidnapping his estranged wife.128
The facts set forth in the plea exposed the defendant to a maximum sentence of
fifty-three months.129 In compliance with Washington state law, a judge,

120. Ring, 536 U.S. at 599 (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 709 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
121. Id. (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 710–11 (1990)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 602 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000)).
124. Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483).
125. Id. at 609 (Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494).
126. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
127. Id. at 305.
128. Id. at 298.
129. Id.
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sitting without a jury, imposed an “exceptional sentence of 90 months after
determining that the defendant acted with deliberate cruelty.”130
Justice Scalia, relying on the rule set forth in Apprendi, added language
that clarified what the rule meant by “statutory maximum.”131 He wrote that
the “statutory maximum . . . is the maximum sentence a judge may impose
solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant.”132 This bright line characterization of the maximum sentence a
judge may impose ensures that “the judge’s authority to sentence derives
wholly from the jury’s verdict.”133 Given that the historical context of the rule
in Apprendi went back to common law at the time of the birth of our Nation,
Justice Scalia’s subtle, yet important, assertion “ensure[s] the [jury’s] control
in the judiciary” which the Founders envisioned.134
D. Cunningham v. California: Apprendi’s Reach Grows
Recently, the Court added to the “intelligible content” of the Sixth
Amendment by striking down California’s determinate sentencing law in
Cunningham v. California.135 The Court held that because the law assigned
the trial judge, and not the jury, the authority to find the facts that expose a
defendant to an elevated “upper term sentence,” the determinate sentencing
law violated the rule established in Apprendi.136
California’s determinate sentencing law provided that a statute defining the
criminal offense allowed for three terms of imprisonment: a lower, middle, and
upper term. 137 The middle term was the default term the judge must impose
unless aggravating or mitigating factors called for the upper or lower term to
be imposed.138 The statute called for the trial judge to make the findings of
aggravation or mitigation through a review of, among other things, the trial
record, statements submitted by the parties, and additional evidence introduced
at the sentencing hearing.139 California’s Judicial Counsel defined the phrase
“circumstances in aggravation” to mean “facts which justify the imposition of
the upper prison term.”140 Additionally, the statute prohibited the use of a “fact
that is an element of the crime,” to impose the upper term.141

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id. at 303.
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303.
Id. at 306.
Id.
Cunningham v. California, 127 S.Ct. 856, 860 (2007).
Id.
Id. at 861.
Id.
Id. at 861-62.
Id. at 862 (emphasis added).
Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 862.
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California argued that because the sentence enhancers were not essential to
the determination of guilt, and that an aggravating circumstance need not be a
fact, its determinate sentencing law did not violate the rule in Apprendi.142
However, the Court rightly recognized California’s first argument as proving
the opposite conclusion.143 The statute specifically did not allow elements of
the charged offense to be used as aggravating circumstances. Therefore, the
judge could only consider facts that were not found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt as aggravating circumstances.144 “Because circumstances in
aggravation are found by the judge, not the jury, and need only be established
by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt,
[California’s determinate sentencing law] violates Apprendi’s bright line
rule.”145
Blakely and Cunningham established two basic principles which further
support the argument that Apprendi applies to Enmund/Tison findings. First,
Apprendi established a “bright line rule.”146 Once it is determined that a fact
exposes a defendant to a penalty beyond the statutory maximum, “that should
be the end of the matter.”147 Second, “the constitutionality of a state’s
sentencing scheme [does not] turn on whether . . . it involves the type of fact
finding ‘that traditionally has been performed by a judge.’”148
III. THE LOWER COURTS DO NOT OBLIGE: ENMUND AND TISON ARE LEFT OUT
After the Court’s decision in Ring, the scope of its application was unclear.
Questions about the Ring decision’s effect on a defendant’s right to a jury
determination of the Enmund/Tison findings, however, did not linger long.
Two lower court cases, State v. Ring (“Ring III”) and Brown v. State, are
illustrative of the rationale used in holding that the rule in Apprendi and Ring
does not apply to the Enmund/Tison findings.149
To properly understand the rationale behind the lower courts’ denial to
extend Ring to the Enmund/Tison findings, it is first necessary to examine the
case on which their holdings rested, Cabana v. Bullock.150 Four years after the
Court decided Enmund, it directly addressed whether an Enmund finding was

142. See id. at 868.
143. Id. at 868.
144. Id.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. Id. (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
147. Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 868 (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313
(2003)).
148. Id. (quoting People v. Black, 113 P.3d 354, 542 (Cal. 2005)).
149. State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc) (Ring III); Brown v. State, 67 P.3d 917
(Okla. Crim. App. 2003).
150. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986).
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required by the Sixth Amendment to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.151
A.

Cabana v. Bullock: The Precedent

In Cabana, the defendant was convicted of first degree capital murder
based on a felony murder theory and sentenced to death as permitted by
Mississippi statute.152 The trial record indicated that Bullock was not the
actual killer and that the jury may have sentenced him to death without ever
having considered whether he killed or intended to kill (findings required by
Enmund).153
However, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not require that
the jury make the Enmund finding so long as it was made “by any court that
has the power to find the facts and vacate the sentence.”154 The Court’s
rationale was two pronged.
First, it distinguished the Enmund finding as one of culpability and not an
element of the offense.155 Because the finding concerned the level of
culpability of the defendant and did not go to his guilt or innocence, the Court
found the Enmund findings fundamentally different than those which are
required by the Sixth Amendment to be found beyond a reasonable doubt.156
To support its distinction, the Court noted that Enmund findings did not affect
the “definition of any substantive offense, even a capital offense.”157 Based on
this distinction, the Court placed the Enmund findings in a general class that
goes to the decision as to whether a particular sentence is appropriate, also
known as sentencing factors.158 The Sixth Amendment had not been held to
encompass these types of findings.159
Secondly, because Enmund did not “impose any particular form of
procedure on the states[,] [a]t what precise point . . . a state chooses to make
the Enmund determination is of little concern from the standpoint of the
Constitution.”160 The Court reasoned that if a defendant who actually killed,
intended to kill, or attempted to kill during the commission of a felony was
sentenced to death and executed, his execution would not violate the Eighth
Amendment no matter who made the requisite culpability determination.

151. Id.
152. Id. at 381.
153. Id. at 379, 384. Because the jury did not make the requisite findings required by
Enmund, the Fifth Circuit reversed Bullock’s death sentence. Id. at 384.
154. Id. at 386.
155. Id. at 385.
156. Cabana, 474 U.S. at 385.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 385–86.
160. Id. at 386.
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Therefore, it would likewise not matter who made the determination that the
defendant lacked the requisite culpability.161
While the Cabana decision only contemplated the requisite culpability
determination as set forth in Enmund, the decision in Tison did not
fundamentally alter the rationale of the arguments in Cabana. Although the
holding in Tison broadened the class of persons eligible for the death penalty,
it was a direct descendant of Enmund.162 After the decision in Ring, Cabana
was dusted off and trotted out.
B.

State v. Ring (Ring III): Dusting Cabana Off

By April 2003, Ring’s case, consolidated with all capital cases, was on
direct appeal from Superior Court to the Supreme Court of Arizona.163 The
court addressed whether the Apprendi/Ring Sixth Amendment principles
required a jury to make the Enmund/Tison findings.164 The Arizona Supreme
Court held that the principles in Apprendi/Ring did not apply to findings.165
The court relied on the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Cabana v.
Bullock.166 The Cabana Court held that the Constitution did not require that a
jury make a determination of the defendant’s level of culpability in capital
felony murder cases.167 The Arizona court was particularly taken with the
language in Cabana that the ruling in Enmund did not establish any “new
elements of the crime that must be found by a jury.”168 Rejecting Ring’s
applicability to the Enmund/Tison findings, the Arizona court reformulated the
determinative question in Apprendi and Ring.169 The question, as it applies to
the Enmund/Tison elements is not whether the state met its burden with regard
to the defendant’s culpable mental state, but whether the defendant’s culpable
mental state is such that the government can administer the death penalty
consistently with the Eighth Amendment.170 The Arizona Supreme Court
distinguished the Enmund/Tison findings from substantive elements of a
greater offense by characterizing the Enmund/Tison findings as a “judicially
crafted instrument used to measure proportionality between a defendant’s
criminal culpability and the sentence imposed.”171

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 64–65.
State v. Ring (Ring III), 65 P.3d 915, 916 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc).
Id. at 944.
Id.
Id. at 945.
Id.
Id.
Ring III, 65 P.3d at 945.
Id.
Id. at 945–46.
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C. Brown v. State: A Different Take, the Same Result
In another 2003 case, Brown v. State,172 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals issued a similar holding to Ring. The court held that “[a]fter Ring, the
Enmund/Tison determination may still be made by a court, even though a jury
must make the factual finding of aggravating circumstances.”173 The court
reasoned that the “Enmund/Tison determination does not make a murderer
eligible for the death penalty. It is a limiting factor, not an enhancing
factor.”174 The court concluded that once a defendant is eligible for the death
penalty, the Enmund/Tison findings can be made by any tribunal.175
IV. ANALYZING WHAT THE LOWER COURTS HAVE WRONG
In holding that the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury to make the
Enmund/Tison findings, the lower courts are mistaken in four important
respects. First, the holdings in each case mischaracterize the function of the
Enmund/Tison factors. Second, the holdings fail to consider the vital role of
the jury in imposing punishments based on a retributive justification.176 Third,
the holdings ignore the historical rationale and purpose on which the Apprendi,
Ring, Blakely, and Cunningham courts based the rule. Finally, the support the
lower courts draw from Cabana is misplaced in light of the opinion in Ring.
A.

Enmund/Tison Factors at Work

An examination of how the Enmund/Tison factors actually function is
essential to the argument that they, like the aggravating circumstances in
Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely, be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt as
required by the reasoning in Apprendi. This examination must first be put in
the context of the facts that the Court has already ruled facts which subject a
defendant to a punishment beyond the statutory maximum.
In Apprendi, the Court found that a fact which related to the defendant’s
particular intent in committing the crime and exposed the defendant to a
punishment that exceeded the statutory maximum must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.177 To do so, the Court introduced the instrumental
test in determining which facts the Sixth Amendment requires be found by a

172. Brown v. State, 67 P.3d 917 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003). Although the defendant in Brown
v. State was not a “non-triggerman” defendant, the court’s discussion and rationale for the
Enmund/Tison factors applied to non-triggermen defendants as well.
173. Id. at 920.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. The retributive theory is the only justification offered in either Enmund or Tison for
imposing the death penalty on felony-murder defendants who did not actually kill. See infra Part
IV.2.
177. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
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jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The question was “one not of form but of
effect—does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment
than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?”178 The Court found that the
trial judge’s determination that Apprendi’s crime was motivated by racial bias
and that his actions were intended to intimidate failed the newly created
standard.179 The Court reasoned that in order to make the finding that
Apprendi committed his crime with the purpose to intimidate the trial judge
had to make a particular factual finding regarding Apprendi’s mens rea.180
Because the New Jersey hate crime statute targeted a particular mens rea, “the
defendant’s intent in committing a crime is perhaps as close as one might hope
to come to a core criminal offense ‘element.’”181
Similarly, the Blakely trial court found, after the defendant pled guilty to
second degree kidnapping, that the defendant acted with deliberate cruelty, a
statutory aggravating factor, and sentenced the defendant to thirty-seven
months beyond the statutory maximum allowed by the defendant’s guilty
plea.182 This aggravating circumstance required the judge to consider the
surrounding circumstances of the offense and make a determination as to the
mens rea of the defendant when he committed the crime, namely that the
defendant acted with deliberate or intentional cruelty.
This factual
183
determination, the Court held, violated the rule in Apprendi.
The Enmund/Tison findings require a similar inquiry into the defendant’s
mens rea. For a non-triggerman capital murder defendant to be sentenced to
death, he or she must have been a major participant in the crime and exhibited
a reckless disregard for human life.184 Thus, these factual inquiries expose a
defendant to a greater sentence than constitutionally allowed in their absence.
Although the Enmund/Tison determination is required by a constitutional
proportionality requirement, and not by statute, it hardly seems logical that
because the Enmund/Tison findings go to a constitutional limit, and not a
statutory limit, they should be analyzed differently. Those states permitting
capital punishment for non-triggermen felony murder defendants may only
target those defendants who exhibit a particular mens rea. For defendants who
did not kill but are charged with first degree murder based on the felony
murder theory, the death penalty cannot be imposed unless they are found to
have been a major participant in the crime and to have exhibited a reckless
indifference to human life.

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000).
Id. at 492.
Id. at 492–93.
Id.
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299–300 (2004).
Id. at 305.
See supra text accompanying note 69.
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The Court in Ring applied the Apprendi rule to aggravating circumstances
that exposed defendants found guilty of first degree murder to the death
penalty.185 Ring was convicted of first degree murder. After the verdict, the
judge found two statutory aggravating circumstances which exposed Ring to
the death penalty.186 Because the Arizona statute required a judge make these
findings before a defendant could be sentenced to death, the Court held the
scheme violated the rule in Apprendi and the Sixth Amendment.187 Arizona’s
statutory aggravating circumstances were created in response to the Supreme
Court’s holdings in Furman and Gregg that the Constitution requires the death
penalty be administered in a way that is not capricious.188 The aggravating
factors had to narrow the class of persons subject to imposition of the death
penalty.189 The Court cited Thomas’s concurring opinion in Apprendi to
explain the function of the aggravators: “If the legislature defines some core
crime and then provides for increasing the punishment of that crime upon a
finding of some aggravating fact[,] . . . the core crime and the aggravating fact
together constitute an aggravated crime.”190
It is difficult to see how the Enmund/Tison findings function differently
than the aggravating circumstances in Ring. The findings narrow the class of
citizens (felony murder defendants who did not kill) who may be subjected to
the death penalty. Unless found to be a major participant in the crime and to
have exhibited a reckless disregard for human life, a defendant who did not kill
or intend to kill cannot sentenced to death.191 If a state legislature defines first
degree murder to include felony murder, but does not require a finding of the
Enmund/Tison elements, these elements still must be found in order to
sentence the defendant to death.192 A first degree murder verdict does not
expose a non-triggerman felony murder defendant to the death penalty just as a
first degree murder conviction does not expose the defendant to the death
penalty absent a finding of aggravating circumstances. Simply because
aggravators are not enumerated in a statute does not take away from the role
they play in a capital sentence for a non-triggerman defendant.

185. See generally Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
186. Id. at 594–95.
187. Id. at 589.
188. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 606 (2002).
189. Zant v. Stephens, U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
190. Ring, 536 U.S. at 605 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 501 (2000)
(Thomas, J. concurring)).
191. See supra text accompanying note 69.
192. Id.
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Theories of Punishment: Felony Murder and the Jury

Although theories of punishment do not occupy an expressly stated role in
the reasoning of the Apprendi, Ring, Blakely, or Cunningham opinions,
consideration of the role these theories play does have an impact of the
question of whom should make the Enmund/Tison determination. While the
utilitarian principle of deterrence is often cited as a justification for the death
penalty,193 it has little to do with the decisions in Enmund and Tison. The
rationale for both decisions was based on an Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis, which cited retribution as “acceptable goal of
punishment.”194 Moreover, Justice Breyer argued in his concurring opinion in
Ring that the Eighth Amendment requires jury sentencing in capital cases
because the only justification for the imposition of the death penalty is
retributive and that the jury is unique in its advantage “in determining, in a
particular case, whether capital punishment will serve that end.”195
The retributive theory of punishment is often criticized as a sort of raw
vengeance masked by philosophy.196 The underlying tenet to the theory is that
“punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting
another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but
must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is
inflicted has committed a crime.”197 The retributive theory is founded in
natural and moral law dating back to the Bible, which viewed any injustice
caused by another as an upset to the natural order.198 Punishment, therefore,
arises out of the need to restore that natural order, and “only the Law of
retribution can determine exactly the kind and degree of punishment.”199
Punishment based on retributive principles must be carefully calibrated to
the offender’s moral culpability. An offender’s mental state is an essential
element in determining the seriousness of an offense.200 A criminal act that is

193. David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of Felony Murder, 8 HARV. J.L. & P.
POL’Y 359, 369 (1985).
194. See generally Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). In fact, Justice O’Connor’s
opinion in Tison is devoid of any discussion of the utilitarian principle of deterrence as a
justification for imposing the death penalty on a non-triggerman capital defendant.
195. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (dismissing the
deterrence effect of the death penalty based on several empirical studies which show little to no
deterrent effect resulting from the death penalty).
196. George Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 SW. U. L. REV. 413, 426–28 (1981).
197. Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law, in CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW
37–38 (West Group 2d ed., 1999).
198. Fletcher, supra note 205, at 426.
199. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, in CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW 188 (Matthew Bender, 3d ed., 2001).
200. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (2002) (referencing Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978)).
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done more purposefully is more serious and therefore deserves a more serious
punishment.201
In the context of the death penalty, and in particular felony murder
defendants who did not actually kill the victim, retributive punishment is
imposed by the jury acting as the moral compass of the community.202 The
jury is “more attuned to ‘the community’s moral sensibility.’”203 The decision
that a defendant be sentenced to death is an “expression of the community’s
belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity
that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.”204
If it is the jury’s role to mete out retributive justice, it can only perform its
function if allowed to consider all facts and circumstances that are required to
expose the defendant to the ultimate punishment. If a single government
official makes any necessary factual determination whether an aggravating
circumstance, or a constitutionally required factual determination such as the
Enmund/Tison findings, the mechanism of justice is short-circuited. A jury
that does not take into consideration the culpability of the defendant, which is
the exact purpose of the Enmund/Tison findings, cannot make a proper
determination as to whether the only adequate response to the defendant’s
conduct is the penalty of death.
C. The Historical Rationale and Purpose of Apprendi, Ring and Blakely
The historical role of the jury in criminal prosecutions provided the
foundation for the holdings in the Apprendi/Ring/Blakely line of cases. When
the same analysis of the jury’s traditional role is applied to the Enmund/Tison
findings, the same conclusion emerges: because Enmund/Tison findings are
facts which expose a non-triggerman to the death penalty, the jury, not the
judge, must find them beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court in Apprendi anchored its extension of the Sixth Amendment
right to a trial by jury in the role that the jury played in criminal proceedings
historically.205 Traditionally, the jury made a determination of all facts
relevant to the guilt of the defendant. Once the guilty verdict was reached, the
judge had little sentencing discretion.206 “The judgment, though pronounced
or awarded by the judges, is not their determination or sentence, but the

201. Id.
202. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615–16 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 615 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 481
(1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
204. Id. at 616 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, J. joint opinion)).
205. Apprendi v. New Jersey 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000).
206. Id. at 479.
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determination and sentence of the law.”207 Most importantly, at the time of the
Nation’s founding, the conceptual distinction between an element of the
offense and a sentencing factor did not exist.208 The jury was charged with
finding “all the facts and circumstances which constitute the offense.”209
Therefore, those facts that later became known as sentencing factors, such as
New Jersey’s hate crime statute in Apprendi or statutory aggravating
circumstances in Ring, were committed to the jury to find beyond a reasonable
doubt.210 The Court ruled as much two years after Apprendi.211 Citing Justice
Stevens’s dissent in Walton v. Arizona, the Court in Ring acknowledged that if
the question of whether aggravators operated as statutory elements of capital
murder “had been posed in 1791, when the Sixth Amendment became law, the
answer would have been clear [because] by that time . . . the jury’s role in
finding facts that would determine a homicide defendant’s eligibility for
capital punishment was particularly well established.”212
The reasoning in Blakely places the capstone on the revival of the
historical right to a jury trial. The Court referenced several sources from the
Nation’s founding to place the role of the jury in its proper context.213 Just as
the founders sought to protect the peoples’ control in the executive and
legislative branches, they envisioned the jury as representing the peoples’
“rightful controul in the judicial department.”214
Against this historical backdrop, the assertion in Cabana that because an
“Eighth Amendment violation can be adequately remedied by any court that
has the power to find facts and vacate the sentence[,] [a]t what precise
point . . . a State chooses to make the Enmund[/Tison] determination is of little

207. Id. at 479–80 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES 396).
208. Id. at 478.
209. Id. (quoting JOHN FREDERICK ARCHBOLD, PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
CASES 44 (15th ed. 1862) (emphasis added).
210.
Where a statute annexes a higher degree of punishment to a common-law felony, if
committed under particular circumstances, . . . the indictment . . . must expressly charge
[the offence] to have been committed under those circumstances, and must state the
circumstances with certainty and precision. [If] the prosecutor prove [sic] the felony to
have been committed, but fail in proving it to have been committed under the
circumstances specified in the statute, the defendant shall be convicted of the commonlaw felony only.
Id. at 480–81 (quoting JOHN FREDERICK ARCHBOLD, PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
CASES 51 (15th ed. 1862)).
211. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
212. Id. at 599 (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 709–10 (1990) (Stevens, J.
dissenting)).
213. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
214. Id. at 306 (quoting LETTER XV BY THE FEDERAL FARMER (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 320 (H. Storing ed. 1981)).
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concern from the standpoint of the Constitution” does not pass muster.215 The
precise point at which the Enmund/Tison determination is made may be of
little concern as far as the Eighth Amendment goes;216 however, it is crucial to
whether the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury has been
violated. Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Cabana touches on this point.
“Enmund[/Tison factors establish] a constitutionally required factual predicate
for the valid imposition of the death penalty;” without these findings “a case
may not pass into that area in which the death penalty is authorized by the
Eighth Amendment.”217 This is a factual determination which increases a
defendant’s maximum punishment from life to death. Based on the Supreme
Court’s decisions and reasoning in Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely, the answer
can only be that the jury alone has the power to make this determination. The
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is “no mere procedural formality, but a
fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure” that ensures
the people’s “control in the judiciary.”218
D. Retiring Cabana v. Bullock
Neither of the opinions in Ring III or Brown devotes much analysis to the
question of whether the Enmund/Tison elements need to be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt as required by the Sixth Amendment.219 The Court
in each case was content to invoke principles asserted in Cabana and move on
to hold that the Sixth Amendment holding of Ring does not extend to the
Eighth Amendment Enmund/Tison factors.220 If these Courts were to consider
the question thoroughly, they would be obligated to come out differently.
The Court in Ring III relied directly on Cabana’s holding that the “federal
constitution does not require a jury to determine a defendant’s level of
culpability in capital felony murder cases.”221 The Court quoted Cabana’s
reasoning that “‘Enmund[/Tison] does not affect the state’s definition of any
substantive offense’” but only prohibits capital punishment on a class of
persons who are guilty of capital murder under the state’s definition of the

215. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986).
216. However, this statement may not be entirely accurate. In both Enmund v. Florida and
Tison v. Arizona, the Court closely examined jury verdicts and the reluctance of jurors to sentence
homicide defendants who did not kill or intend to kill to death in its analysis as to whether the
imposition of death penalty on such defendants violated the Eighth Amendment. See supra text
accompanying notes 42–44, 63.
217. Cabana, 474 U.S. at 396 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
218. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305–06.
219. State v. Ring (Ring III), 65 P.3d 915, 944-45 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc); Brown v. State, 67
P.3d 917, 920 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003).
220. Ring III, 65 P.3d at 945; Brown, 67 P.3d at 920.
221. Ring III, 65 P.3d at 945.
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crime.222 Because the Enmund/Tison findings do not go to the question of
“whether the state has met its burden but whether, given a defendant’s culpable
mental state, the government can impose capital punishment consistent with
the Eighth Amendment[],” the Court held, the distinction created in Cabana
“[withstood] Apprendi and Ring.”223
This “distinction” that Cabana created between elements of the offense224
and the Enmund/Tison findings, however, is no longer intelligible. In 1986,
when Cabana was decided, the Court subscribed to the understanding that a
state’s labeling a fact a sentencing factor rather than a substantive element of
the offense controlled whether the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury
attached to such a fact.225
Apprendi shifted this understanding, and since its decision has been handed
down, the Court has been endeavoring to “give intelligible content to the Sixth
Amendment right of jury trial.”226 This “intelligible content” began with
Apprendi’s holding that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.”227 Central to the Court’s reasoning in Apprendi
was a desire to reign in a state’s ability to define away constitutionally required
facts.228 The Court clarified this goal four years later, stating that “the
statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or
admitted by the defendant.”229
Ring III was decided before Blakely clarified Apprendi and Ring. So, at
the time, the superficial distinction between the substantive elements of a
crime, which must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
Enmund/Tison findings, which are sentencing considerations, was plausible.230

222. Id. (quoting Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385 (1986)).
223. Id.
224. The Court viewed aggravating factors as “substantive elements of the offense.” Ring III,
65 P.3d at 945.
225. Apprendi v. New Jersey was a marked departure from previous Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence. Prior cases allowed the states much latitude in defining what elements of an
offense were and what were sentencing factors that justified either a more lenient or harsher
punishment. See supra text accompanying notes 71–74.
226. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004).
227. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489–90. Ring v. Arizona extended this exact
holding to aggravating factors for capital murder cases. Id. at 490, 494.
228. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 486.
229. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303.
230. However, the Arizona Court could have come to the same conclusion based on the
wording of the controlling question in Apprendi—“does the required finding expose the
defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?” Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 494. The Court in Blakely held the same, only more emphatically. Blakely, 542 U.S.
at 296, 303.
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However, if the Enmund/Tison findings are placed into the intelligible content
of the Sixth Amendment as described in Blakely, it is clear that the
“distinction” that Cabana and Ring III contemplate disappears. If a jury finds
a non-triggerman defendant guilty of first degree murder, without finding that
the defendant intended to kill or was recklessly indifferent to human life and
was a major participant in the murder, then presumably the judge would have
to make the Enmund/Tison findings before the death penalty could be
imposed.231 Quite simply, this scenario would violate the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt of all
essential facts for the imposition of a punishment under the
Apprendi/Ring/Blakely analysis. In fact, until Ring, statutory aggravating
factors were treated in the same manner as the Enmund/Tison findings.232 It
does not matter whether the Enmund/Tison findings are labeled as substantive
elements because the controlling question is “not one of form, but of effect.”233
Another troubling aspect of Cabana’s reasoning is its assertion that an
“Eighth Amendment violation can be adequately remedied by any court that
has the power to find the facts and vacate the sentence. At what precise point
in its criminal process a State chooses to make the Enmund determination is of
little concern from the stand point of the Constitution.”234 This, indeed, is a
puzzling statement. Essentially, the Court did not see a problem with allowing
a jury to deliver a guilty verdict and declare that the defendant is unfit to live
“without first considering his personal responsibility and moral guilt.”235 It
hardly seems logical or judicially efficient to allow a jury to return a verdict for
death without informing that jury of all constitutionally required facts
necessary to impose the death penalty on a defendant. Allowing a judge or
appellate court to make the requisite Enmund/Tison findings pushes these
constitutionally required determinations as to whether a person may live or die
to the position of a “judicial afterthought.”236
The court in Brown v. State took a slightly different path to holding that the
Sixth Amendment does not require that the Enmund/Tison elements be found
by a jury.237 However, as in Ring III, the court’s reasoning was based on an
untenable distinction between the function of aggravating circumstances and

231. As was the case in Ring v. Arizona, “The judge recognized that Ring was eligible for the
death penalty only if he was [the] actual killer or if he was major participant in the armed robbery
that led to the killing and exhibited a reckless disregard or indifference to human life.” 536 U.S.
584, 594 (2002). The judge concluded that Ring was the actual killer and a major participant in
the armed robbery “which carries with it a grave risk of death.” Id.
232. See generally Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
233. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494.
234. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986).
235. Id. at 397 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 394.
237. Brown v. State, 67 P.3d 917, 920 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003).
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the Enmund/Tison findings. The main difference between the two, the court
reasoned, was that the “Enmund/Tison determination does not make a murder
eligible for the death penalty,” but that it only serves as a limiting factor, not an
enhancing factor such as aggravating circumstances.238 The court went on to
state that only after the defendant has been found eligible for the death penalty
is the Enmund/Tison finding relevant.239
This distinction, too, can no longer said to be true, if it ever was at all. The
court could have easily said that a defendant is not eligible for the death
penalty unless the Enmund/Tison findings are made.240 In fact, when the Court
in Ring described the Arizona trial court’s findings after Ring was found guilty
of first degree murder by a jury, it stated that “the judge recognized that Ring
was eligible for the death penalty only if” the Enmund/Tison findings were
made.241 The language the court in Brown uses seems more appropriate for a
discussion weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the
sentencing phase.242 However, the Enmund/Tison factors are not mitigators;
they are findings of fact that are constitutionally required before a capital
defendant who did not kill may be put to death.243
Additionally, strict adherence to the distinction that the court in Brown
announced allows form to take precedence over effect, which is exactly what
the Courts in Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely were trying to avoid. Because a
non-triggerman defendant cannot be sentenced to death unless found to be
recklessly indifferent to human life and a major participant in the felony, this
factual determination is one that increases the maximum penalty that may be
imposed. If a jury does not make this determination in its verdict, a judge must
make this finding before imposing the death sentence, which, as stated before,
is not permitted under Apprendi/Ring/Blakely.
The labeling of the
Enmund/Tison finding as one of limitation and not enhancement has no bearing
on its actual function.
One last concern that both the Ring III court (indirectly) and the Brown
court addressed is the fact that the Ring holding only extended Apprendi’s
holding to statutory aggravating factors.244 How, then, can the holding in Ring

238. Id.
239. Id.
240. In Zant v. Stephens, the Court noted that absent the finding of a statutory aggravating
circumstance, “[a] case may not pass . . . into that area in which the death penalty is authorized.”
462 U.S. 862, 872 (1983).
241. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 594 (2002) (emphasis added).
242. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) (stating that it is permissible “for
judges . . . taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender—in
imposing a judgment with the range prescribe by the statute.”).
243. See supra text accompanying note 68.
244. See State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 945-46 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc); Brown v. State, 67 P.3d
917, 919-20 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003).
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be said to encompass Enmund/Tison findings, which are required by the Eighth
Amendment proportionality principles? Perhaps the main (and not so
glamorous) reason is that the claim in Ring was narrowly crafted and it simply
did not include the Enmund/Tison determination. This explanation, however,
should not be dispositive of the issue. Justice Scalia gave some insight into the
true nature of the inquiry in his concurring opinion in Ring. He wrote, “the
fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is
that all facts essential to the imposition of the level of punishment that the
defendant receives—whether the statute calls them elements of the offense,
sentencing factors, or Mary Jane—must be found by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.”245 This formulation of the Sixth Amendment right begs the
question: what if the legislature does not include the essential fact in the statute
at all, but the finding of the fact is required by the Eighth Amendment? Does
the Sixth Amendment right vanish as to this fact? Hardly. In its capital
punishment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has deemed as an Eighth
Amendment constitutional requirement a channeling and limiting of the
sentencer’s discretion in imposing the death penalty.246 Legislatures responded
to these limitations by incorporating aggravating factors that sufficiently
narrow the class of eligible defendants, which Ring required to be found by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.247 As discussed earlier, the Enmund/Tison
determination functions in the same way as the statutory aggravating factors.248
A state legislature can no more avoid the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee
by naming an aggravating factor “Mary Jane” than it can by simply omitting it
from the statute.
CONCLUSION
A truism passes into the realm of meaningless cliché when it is repeated
without one’s giving thought to its significance or meaning. When it comes to
a non-triggerman defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination
beyond a reasonable doubt of any fact that exposes him or her to a sentence
that exceeds the statutory maximum, how different is death? If and when the
Supreme Court revisits this issue, it should apply Apprendi’s bright line rule
and that should be the end of the matter. The Enmund/Tison culpability
findings function much like the facts in Apprendi and Blakely and the
aggravating circumstances in Ring and Cunningham–they increase the
maximum penalty a non-triggerman felony murder defendant could receive in
their absence. Apprendi and Ring started the Sixth Amendment revival. Cases

245.
246.
247.
248.

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Id. at 606 (majority opinion).
Id. at 606–07.
Supra Part VI.1.
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such as Blakely and Cunningham have strengthened it. All that is left is for the
Court to bring the Enmund/Tison findings under the tent.
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